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To	Whom	the	Spoils?		I		Introduction	Although	 less	 than	 two	 decades	 old,	 the	 twenty-first	 century	 has	 been	characterized	by	economic,	political	 and	cultural	upheaval.	 	The	distribution	of	income	and	wealth	within	and	between	countries	and	regions	has	become	more	unequal,	economic	growth	has	declined,	the	distribution	of	the	benefits	from	that	slower	 growth	 has	 become	 more	 skewed	 toward	 the	 very	 upper	 tail	 of	 the	wealth	and	income	distributions,	wages	have	stagnated	if	not	fallen	in	real	terms,	globalization	 has	 led	 to	 jobs	migrating	 from	 the	 developed	West	 to	 the	 Global	South,	jobs	globally	have	been	lost	to	automation,	and	free	trade	has	delivered	its	promised	 benefits	 to	 some	 rather	 than	 to	 all.	 	 In	 the	 civic	 arena,	 trust	 of	 and	respect	for	“the	elite,”	whether	they	are	political	or	business	leaders,	academics,	journalists	or	other	experts	has	diminished.		Faith	in	the	democratic	process	has	weakened	 while	 faith	 in	 autocratic	 leaders	 free	 of	 the	 checks	 and	 balances	 of	democracy	has	risen.	Culturally,	in	some	countries,	traditional	mores	and	values	have	 been	 displaced	 by	 progressive	 mores	 and	 values,	 in	 other	 countries	 the	opposite	has	occurred.	 	Reaction	to	this	economic,	political,	and	cultural	tumult	has	been	reflected	in	the	recent	presidential	election	in	the	United	States,	in	the	referendum	 on	 European	 Union	 membership	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 in	 the	referendum	on	political	 reform	 in	 Italy,	 in	 the	public	debates	 in	anticipation	of	the	presidential	elections	in	France,	and	in	the	rise	of	autocrats	in	Russia,	Turkey,	the	Philippines,	Venezuela	and	elsewhere.			In	each	country	there	has	been	a	cry	by	 those	 who	 feel	 economically,	 politically	 and/or	 culturally,	 that	 is,	 socially,	
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marginalized	 that	 they	 have	 had	 enough.	 	 They	 demand	 change,	 specifically	 a	restoration	of	what	they	see	as	their	central	position	in	the	economy,	in	politics,	and	 in	culture,	 that	 is,	 in	society,	and	 their	 fair	share	of	 the	economic,	political,	and	cultural,	that	is	the	societal	benefits	that	this	centrality	implies.					
Contrary	to	Margaret	Thatcher’s	dictum	that	“there	is	no	society,”	society	and	the	wrenching	 effects	 of	 societal	 change	 are	 critical	 because	 humans	 are	 a	 social	beings,	 existing	 in	 and	 formed	 by	 society.	 	 The	 nature	 of	 this	 societal	 link	 is	essential	to	defining	who	a	person	is	since	identity,	preferences,	place	and	status	are	defined	 in	reference	 to	society.	 	Who	one	 is	and	 is	not,	as	opposed	to	what	one	 is	 or	 is	 not,	 is	 socially	 interpreted,	 and	 one’s	 behavior,	 as	 well	 as	 others’	behavior	in	response,	depends	on	these	social	 interpretations	(Arrow	1994).	 	 If	we	 accept	 that	 an	 individual	 is	 malleable	 and	 is	 formed	 by	 society	 and	 social	interaction,	the	only	way	to	understand	the	individual	and	individual	choices	 is	to	understand	the	society	in	which	the	individual	lives	and	the	society	in	which	the	individual	was	formed.		When	society	changes,	so	must	the	individual.		
In	 this	 paper	 I	 examine	 societal	 linkages	 in	 the	 context	 of	 convulsive	 societal	change.		When	society	changes	so	do	the	societal	links	that	bind	the	individual	to	society,	some	strengthening,	some	weakening.			To	do	this	I	build	on	a	model	of	a	goal-oriented,	socially-embedded	agent	who	is	formed	by	and	makes	choices	in	a	social	setting.	 	 	Using	this	model,	 I	examine	how	individuals	respond	to	societal	change	using	the	recent	referendum	in	the	UK	and	the	presidential	election	in	the	US	for	context,	examining	specifically	the	role	hope	and	despair	play	in	enabling	or	dis-enabling	an	individual	in	navigating	change.			I	conclude	by	asking	how	the	
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costs	and	benefits	of	change	should	be	distributed,	and	society’s	role	 in	guiding	this	distribution.		
II		Social	Structure,	Expectations	and	Goals1	In	 standard	 economic	 analysis	 an	 individual	 is	 modeled	 as	 an	 atomistic	 actor	who	interacts	with	and	obeys	the	rules	of	the	market	rather	than	of	society.		The	individual	 makes	 decisions	 given	 preferences,	 which	 are	 defined	 absolutely.	Granovetter	(1985,	p.487)	suggests	to	the	contrary	that	“[A]ctors	do	not	behave	or	decide	as	atoms	outside	a	social	context,	….	Their	attempts	at	purposive	action	are	instead	embedded	in	concrete,	ongoing	systems	of	social	relations.”		In	a	step	toward	 returning	 society	 to	 its	 central	 position	 in	 the	 decisions	 taken	 by	economic	actors,	preferences	 can	be	defined	over	 individual	 identities	 (Akerlof	and	 Kranton	 2000)	 which	 have	 a	 social	 aspect,	 or	 preferences	 can	 be	 socially	referenced,	so	that	how	one’s	consumption	of	goods,	services	or	 leisure	or	how	one’s	wealth,	income	or	employment	status,	or	how	one’s	support	of	one’s	family	compares	to	others’	determines	how	satisfied	one	is.	 	This	preference	structure	can	be	adapted	so	social	 references,	 such	as	 comparisons	of	 income	with	one’s	neighbors,	 are	 replaced	 by	 personal	 goals	 or	 social	 goals	which	 society	 deems	important	 to	 obtain,	 such	 as	 a	 personal	 or	 social	 identity,	 as	 in	 Brekke,	 et	 al.	(2003),	 Shayo	 (2009),	 or	 Eguia	 (2013)	 or	 aspirations	 as	 in	Dalton,	 Ghosal	 and	Mani	(2014).			
To	 bring	 society	 more	 directly	 into	 our	 analysis,	 the	 individual	 can,	 as	 Arrow	(1994)	 suggests,	 be	 characterized	 by	 a	 preference	 ordering	 over	 a	 set	 of	 goals	
                                                
1 This analysis is developed in a series of papers by Pecchenino (2011, 2015) based on 
a model proposed in Jeitschko, O’Connell and Pecchenino (2008). 
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which	society	construes	as	important.	Actions	must	be	taken	and	resources	must	be	dedicated	to	move	toward	or	achieve	those	goals.		Society,	externally,	as	well	as	 the	 individual,	 internally,	 measures	 and	 validates	 goal	 achievement	 that	determines	his	satisfaction.	 	Society,	however,	 is	not	static.	 	Thus,	the	society	in	which	 one	 is	 formed	 is	 not	 necessarily	 the	 society	 in	 which	 one	 finds	 oneself	upon	attaining	one’s	majority,	or	in	mid-life	or	in	old	age.		As	society	changes	so	do	 societally	 approved	 goals.	 	 Societal	 change	 can	 change	 the	 goals,	 the	preference	 ordering	 over	 goals,	 the	 actions	 and	 resources	 required	 to	 move	toward	or	attain	those	goals,	and	the	value	of	goal	achievement.			
Building	on	the	model	proposed	by	Jeitschko,	O’Connell	and	Pecchenino	(2008),	further	developed	by	Pecchenino	(2011,	2015),	and	presented	here	in	its	entirety,	suppose	individuals	plan	to	achieve	a	goal	or	set	of	goals	all	of	which	are	socially	construed	as	important	and	goal	achievement	is	measured	relative	to	the	social	ideal	for	that	goal.		The	individual	agent	has	a	single	preference	ordering	defined	over	N	distinct	goals.		Individual	goals	can	be	multifaceted	or	unidimensional.		As	society	believes	these	goals	to	be	important,	their	social	importance	determines	their	place	in	the	preference	ranking.		This	place	can	change	as	society	changes.	Goal	achievement	may	require	gaining	access	to,	maintaining	or	improving	one’s	place	in	society.		Since	society	is	not	monolithic,	gaining	access	to,	maintaining	or	improving	one’s	standing	in	one	social	grouping	may	conflict	with	gaining	access	to,	maintaining	 and	 improving	 one’s	 standing	 in	 another	 social	 grouping.	 	 The	agent	must	 balance	 these	 competing	 forces,	 or	 by	 pursuing	 one	 goal	 abandon	another.	 	 While	 goal	 achievement	 requires	 individual	 effort,	 it	 also	 requires	social	 recognition	 and	 approval,	 actual	 or	 perceived,	 as	 well	 as	 individual	
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perceptions	of	worthiness.	 	 Further,	 the	 society	 in	which	one	 lives	 is	not	 static	and	evolves.		This	means	that	what	is	socially	important	or	what	affords	one	high	social	status	can	change	over	time,	either	gradually	or	suddenly.	 	These	societal	changes	 affect	 the	 ordering	 over	 goals,	 the	 goals	 themselves	 and	 the	 ease	 or	difficulty	of	achieving	or	approaching	them.	
Let		  Γ(g1	–	g1*,…,	gN	–	gN*)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (1)	represent	an	individual’s	preference	ordering	over	goals.		His	personal	and	social	well-being	 is	 a	 function	 of	 his	 n=1,	 …,	 N	 goals,	 gn,	 	 relative	 to	 its	 socially	determined	 ideal	 (bliss	 point),	 gn*,	 that	 is,	 	 gn	 –	 gn*	 ,	 for	 all	 n.	 Assume																				Γn(…,	gn	–	gn*,…)	>	0	(<0)	for	gn	–	gn*	<	0	(>0),	for	all	n	=	1,…	,N	and	that	Γnn	≤	0	for	all	 n	 =	 1,…,N.	 	 The	 sign	 of	 𝚪nm	 n	 ≠	 m	 is	 positive	 if	 the	 n	 and	 m	 goals	 are	complements,	negative	if	they	are	substitutes,	and	zero	if	they	are	independent.		Note,	since	society	and	what	society	interprets	as	important	changes,	the	socially	determined	ideals,	the	gn*,	will	also	change	as	will	the	value	of	goal	achievement.	
Assume	 one’s	 goals	 and	 the	 effort,	 the	 individual’s	 interrelated	 resources	 –	emotional,	 psychological,	 spiritual,	 intellectual,	 physical	 and	 economic	 –	expended,	required	to	attain	them	are	related	as	follows			 )(ˆ ** nnnnn eegg ν−=− 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (2)	where		 ˆn n mn m
m n
e e eβ
≠
= +∑ 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (3)	
where	 neˆ 	is	the	effort	the	individual	puts	into	the	nth	goal,	which	is	the	sum	of	his	effort	dedicated	to	the	nth	goal,	en,	 	and	any	spillover	from	effort	dedicated	to	the	
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other	 goals,	βmnem,	 for	 all	m,	where	βmn	 <	1.	 	en*(νn)	represents	 the	 individual’s	belief	of	the	social	belief	(Orléan	2004)	of	the	effort	required	to	attain	the	social	ideal,	a	construct	that	depends	on	the	society	in	which	the	individual	lives	both	narrowly	 and	broadly	defined,	where	νn	 is	 a	 vector	 of	 conditioning	 variables	 –	focal	 points	 upon	 which	 beliefs	 about	 goal	 n	 are	 conditioned.	 	 Among	 these	conditioning	 variables	 could	 be	 the	 individual’s	 emotional	 state	 (Pfister	 and	Böhm	 2008),	 social	 structures	 (Portes	 and	 Sensenbrenner,	 1993),	 the	 moral	strictures	 of	 the	 society	 of	 which	 the	 individual	 is	 part	 (Kaplow	 and	 Shavell	2007),	 the	 individual’s	 circumstances	 that	 are	 determined	 in	 part	 by	 the	individual’s	 (relative)	 wealth	 or	 poverty	 (Dalton,	 Ghosal	 and	 Mani	 2014),	 the	neighborhood	 in	which	he	 lives	 (Ellen	 and	Turner	1997;	Atkinson	 and	Kintrea	2004)),	the	acute	(Buckert,	et	al.	2014)	or	chronic	stress	the	individual	is	under,	or	 one’s	 religion,	 race	 or	 creed.	 Goals	 and	 the	 ordering	 thereof,	 the	 value	 of	individual	 resources,	 conditioning	 variables	 and	 the	 social	 beliefs	 implied	depend	 on	 context.	 	 Finally,	 achievement	 of	 or	movement	 toward	 one’s	 social	goal	 ideals,	 regardless	 of	 effort	 expended,	 depends	 on	 social	 recognition	 and	approval	thereof,	which	is	not	necessarily	fixed.		Assume,	similar	to	Eguia	(2013)	that	for	each	social	ideal	there	is	a	minimum	distance	requirement	that	ensures	social	inclusion,	dn,	where	dn	is	determined	by	societal	expectations,	which	may	not	be	 fixed,	and	 individual	perceptions	thereof.	 If	 |gn(e)	–	gn*|	>	 	dn,	 then,	even	dedicating	 all	 his	 resources	 to	 goal	 n	 will	 not	 allow	 him	 to	 achieve	 social	inclusion	in	that	social	sphere.	
Substituting	 the	 relationship	of	 effort	 to	 goal	 achievement	 into	 the	 individual’s	utility	function,	the	individual’s	task	is	to	allocate	his	resources		
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n
nee ,		 0≥ne 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (4)	
to	devise	a	plan	to	achieve/move	toward	his	desired	goals.		Since	an	individual’s	total	 resources	 are	 a	 function	 of	 his	 emotional,	 psychological,	 spiritual,	intellectual,	 physical	 and	 economic	 resources,	 they	 are	 not	 fixed,	 and	 can	 be	enhanced	or	diminished	by	societal	change.		
The	agent	thus	optimizes		
	 Γ e1 + βm1
m≠1
∑ em − e1*(ν1),...,eN + βmN
m≠N
∑ em − eN*(ν N )
%
&
'
(
)
* 	 	 	 	 (5)	
subject	 to	 his	 resource	 constraint	 (4),	 nonnegativity,	 and	 minimum	 distance	constraints.		The	first-order	conditions	of	the	agent’s	problem	are		 Γn + Γmβmn
m≠n
∑ −λ +µ n 	+	 =	0	,	n	=	1,…,	N	 	 	 	 	 (6)	
where	 λ	 is	 the	 marginal	 disutility	 of	 effort,	 µn	 is	 the	 multiplier	 on	 the	nonnegativity	 constraint,	 and	 	is	 the	 multiplier	 on	 the	 minimum	 distance	constraint.		The	multiplier	µn	>	0	if	the	optimal	choice	of	en	≤	0:		all	effort	is	put	into	the	individual’s	other	goals	since	the	marginal	disutility	of	effort	exceeds	the	marginal	utility	of	effort	 invested	 in	 that	goal	either	directly	or	 indirectly.	 	The	multiplier	 	>	0	if	 	|gn(e)	–	gn*	|	>	 	dn.	 	Failure	to	get	close	enough	to	one’s	goal	ideals	 is	 self	 and/or	 societally	 assessed:	 	 the	 individual’s	 resources,	 however	deployed,	are	not	individually	or	societally	perceived	to	be	adequate	to	the	task.		This	 could	 be	 as	 a	 result	 of	 personal	 failure,	 or	 it	 could	 be	 a	 result	 of	 societal	(economic,	political,	or	cultural)	change	that,	in	effect,	moves	the	goal	posts,	the	
gn*	 	 increase	 and	 with	 it	 the	 effort	 required	 to	 achieve	 it	 even	 if	 the	 required	
ω n
ω n
ω n
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closeness	to	the	goal	required	for	social	 inclusion	does	not,	although	it	too	may	change	and	the	necessary	closeness	could	also	increase.			
In	 this	 model	 individuals’	 utility	 is	 defined	 over	 goals.	 There	 is	 an	 interplay	between	 the	 individual	 and	 society	 that	 determines	 the	 cost	 of	 achieving	 his	goals,	 the	 resources	 he	 has	 to	 do	 so,	 and	 the	 recognition	 of	 success	 or	 failure.		The	 utility	 function	 does	 not	 conform	 to	 expected	 utility	 assumptions	 since	probabilities,	 whether	 exogenous,	 affected	 by	 own	 actions	 or	 conditioned	 by	social	 forces,	 are	 embedded	 in	 the	 effort	 required	 for	 attainment	 of	 one’s	 goal	ideal,	 an	 ideal	 not	 fixed	 nor	 static	 since	 its	 achievement	 is	 socially	 mediated.		Further,	 utility	 is	 neither	 separable	 across	 goals	 with	 different,	 perhaps	 time	varying,	 probabilities	 of	 achievement	 nor	 across	 time.	 	 Here	 the	 perception	 of	time	and	the	definition	of	the	time	horizon	can	also	be	socially	mediated	and	vary	from	the	eschaton	to	an	irrelevance.		Given	this	structure	it	is	possible	to	analyze	the	interactions	across	goals,	plans	to	achieve	those	goals	as	a	result	of	changes	societal	change	(see	Jeitschko,	O’Connell	and	Pecchenino,	2008,	for	derivations).		
III		When	the	World	Changes	
Given	 the	 interplay	 between	 the	 individual	 and	 society,	 individuals	 confronted	with	any	change	that	affects	the	goals	society	construes	as	important	or	the	cost	of	achieving	them	have	two	options.		They	can	respond	to	those	changes	and	do	their	 best	 to	 adjust	 their	 behavior	 so	 that	 their	 now	 individually	 utility	maximizing	goals	can	be	approached	or	achieved,	noting	that	 these	may	not	be	the	goals	that	they	were	previously	pursuing	and	taking	into	account	the	current	costs	of	doing	so	as	well	as	their	available	resources	may	be	higher	or	lower.		Or,	
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they	can	reject	 the	societal	changes	and	attempt	 to	change	society	and	 thereby	the	goals	it	construes	as	important.				
To	 ground	 the	 discussion,	 consider	 first	 the	 following	 examples	 of	 economic,	political	 and/or	 cultural	 change,	 and	 second	 consider	 individual	 and	 group	reactions	thereto	filtered	through	the	lens	of	the	model.	
Brexit	(see	Davies	2016,	Darvas	2016,	Goodwin	and	Heath	2016,	 Inglehart	 and	Norris	2016,	Kaufmann	2016,	Morgan	2016):	 	 In	2013	 then	UK	Prime	Minister	David	 Cameron	 promised	 that	 if	 the	 Conservative	 Party	 won	 the	 next	 general	election	 he	 would	 call	 a	 referendum	 on	 the	 UK’s	 membership	 in	 the	 EU.	 	 He	wanted	 to	 settle	 the	 question	 of	 EU	 membership	 once	 and	 for	 all,	 thereby	silencing	 the	 Euro-skeptic	 wing	 of	 the	 Conservative	 party,	 certain	 that	 the	 UK	would	 remain	 in	 the	 EU	 since,	 from	his	 perspective,	 the	UK	was	 economically,	politically	 and	 culturally	 stronger	 inside	 rather	 than	 outside.	 A	majority	 of	 UK	voters	saw	things	differently.	 	For	 them	the	referendum	was	an	opportunity	 to	assert,	 among	 other	 things,	 their	 identity	 as	 a	 proud	 British	 people.	 	 Not	European,	 but	 British:	 	 British	 by	 birth,	 British	 by	 inclination,	 British	 by	 right,	British	 by	 law,	 British	 by	 institution,	 British	 by	 language,	 British.	 Many	 who	voted	their	identity	rather	than	their	pocketbooks	voted	against	their	immediate	economic	 advantage	 to	 reestablish	 an	 economic,	 cultural	 and	 political	environment	 in	which	the	UK	would	again	be	sovereign.	 	Those	voting	to	 leave	were,	on	average,	older,	less	educated,	living	outside	the	greater	London	or	other	metropolitan	 areas,	 English	 or	 Welsh	 rather	 than	 Scottish	 or	 Northern	 Irish.		They	found	in	the	EU	and	in	the	UK’s	membership	thereof	a	focus	for	their	anger	
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and	 despair	 at	 what	 they	 had	 lost	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis	 and	 the	austerity	 regime	 that	 followed,	 globalization	 and	 the	 deindustrialization	 of	 the	UK:	 	 socially	 cohesive,	 generally	 homogeneous,	 safe,	 drug	 and	 crime	 free	communities,	 the	 ability	 to	 own	 one’s	 on	 home,	 lifetime	 employment	 in	unionized	 industries	 (think	 coal,	 steel,	 heavy	manufacturing)	with	 good	wages,	benefits,	and	secure	pensions.	 	Membership	 in	 the	EU	had,	 first,	outsourced	UK	sovereignty	 to	 Brussels,	 emasculating	 the	 UK.	 	 Further,	 the	 EU	 had	 delivered,	they	 averred,	 (i)	 an	 influx	 of	 immigrants	 who	 were	 paid	 generous	 benefits,	stealing	British	jobs,	driving	down	wages,	and	refusing	to	integrate	or	ascribe	to	British	values,	(ii)	restrictions	on	supporting	essential	British	industries,	such	as	autos	 and	 steel,	 (iii)	 senseless	 regulation	 on,	 for	 example,	 electric	 kettles,	toasters	and	bananas,	(iv)	the	weakening	of	the	NHS,	(v)	the	expansion	of	rights	and	protections	to	the	LGBTQ	communities,	etc.		Leaving	the	EU	would	allow	the	British	to	become	sovereign	and	British	again.	When	the	votes	were	counted,	52	percent	 of	 the	 British	 people	 who	 voted	 chose	 Brexit,	 leaving	 almost	 half	wondering	what	had	become	of	their	proudly	European	country.			
Trump	(see	Allin	2016,	Crooke	2016,	Cramer	2016,	Davis	and	Fields	2016,	Davis	and	 Hilsenrath	 2016,	 Hochschild	 2016,	 Inglehart	 and	 Norris	 2016,	 Irwin	 and	Katz	2016,	Thompson	2016):	In	the	United	States,	after	a	long	and	relatively	slow	recovery	 from	 the	 financial	 crisis	 and	 worldwide	 recession,	 in	 a	 generally	positive	 economic	 environment	 of	 steady	 growth,	 low	 unemployment,	 low	inflation	and	low	interest	rates,	although	ever	widening	income	inequality	both	at	 the	 individual	 and	 regional	 level,	 a	 populist	 candidate,	who	was	 not	 closely	aligned	with	 the	 traditional	 political	 and	 economic	 positions	 of	 his	 own	 party,	
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was	elected.		During	his	campaign	he	connected	with	a	part	of	the	US	population	who	 felt	 the	American	dream	was	no	 longer	possible	 for	 them.	 	Responding	 to	their	 deep-seated	 grievances,	 he	 promised	 (i)	 to	 expel	 illegal	 immigrants	 and	repel	new	migrants,	by	building	a	wall	between	the	US	and	Mexico	for	which	the	Mexican	people	would	pay	and	by	 the	 “extreme	vetting”	of	Muslim	migrants	 to	save	 America	 (economically,	 politically	 and	 culturally)	 for	 Americans,	 (ii)	 to	defeat	 ISIS	 once	 and	 for	 all,	 (iii)	 to	 invalidate	 trade	 pacts	 and	mutual	 defense	treaties	that,	allegedly,	benefitted	others	and	imposed	unilateral	costs	on	the	US	benefitting	only	our	feckless	allies,	(iv)	to	rebuild	the	manufacturing	base	of	the	economy	 thereby	 restoring	 lost	 factory	 jobs	 with	 their	 implied	 union	 wages,	benefits	and	pension	entitlements,	(v)	to	restore	the	crumbling	infrastructure,	(vi)	to	bring	back	to	the	US	all	firms	that	have	moved	their	operations	overseas	and	tax	 them	 unmercifully	 should	 they	 not	 agree	 to	 do	 so.	 	 He	 questioned	 the	scientific	basis	 for	 climate	 change	and	promised	 to	 revoke	US	 compliance	with	the	 Paris	 Agreement.	 	 He	 defied	 social	 convention	 and	 political	 correctness	 by	demeaning	 women,	 members	 of	 the	 LGBTQ	 community,	 Muslims	 (US	 citizens	and	 otherwise),	 war	 heroes	 and	 veterans,	 the	 disabled,	 the	 press,	 Mexicans,	African-Americans,	 Asians	 and	 others.	 	 He	 denigrated	 elites,	 experts,	 policy-wonks,	the	heads	of	government	agencies,	and	all	those	not	agreeing	with	him,	as	being	 anti-American:	 	 not	 one	 of	 us.	 	 	 He	 praised	 foreign	 autocrats	 who	 act	independent	 of	 a	 cumbersome	 democratic	 process.	 	 In	 short,	 and	 in	 his	 own	words,	he	promised	to	make	America	great	again.		Those	who	voted	for	him	were,	predominately	 but	 not	 exclusively,	 white,	 especially	 those	 who	 live	 in	predominately	white	areas	with	very	few	immigrants,	less	educated,	older,	male,	
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but	 not	 necessarily	 poorer,	 folk	 holding	 what	 they	 see	 as	 traditional	 values.		Those	 who	 did	 not,	 and	 they	 were	 the	 majority,	 largely	 clustered	 on	 the	multiethnic,	 multicultural,	 liberal	 cosmopolitan	 coasts,	 wondered	 what	 had	become	of	their	already	great	nation.	
Brexit	and	the	Trump	victory	can	be	 interpreted	 in	the	context	of	 the	model	as	effecting	 significant	 societal	 change.	 	 This	 change	 will,	 first,	 modify	 if	 not	 the	actual	goals	the	ordering	thereof.		Now	what	society	most	values	may	shift	away	from	the	cosmopolitan	toward	the	traditional	(from	London	to	the	North,	or	from	the	coasts	to	the	heartland),	and	in	so	doing	reset	the	goal	ideals,	the	gn*.		Second,	the	 victories	 change	 the	 conditioning	 variables,	 the	νn	 focal	 points	 upon	which	beliefs	about	goal	n	are	conditioned,	making	the	costs	of	goal	achievement	lower	for	those	on	the	winning	side,	since	society	has	changed	in	their	favor,	although,	perhaps,	 higher	 for	 those	on	 the	 losing	 side.	 	Among	 these	 are	 the	 individual’s	emotional	state	(improved	if	one	is	on	the	winning	side	since	now	there	is	more	reason	 to	 hope	 for	 a,	 from	 the	 individual’s	 perspective,	 better	 future,	 dis-improved	 otherwise	 since	 there	 is	 reason	 to	 despair	 about	 the	 now	 more	nationalist	 less	 internationalist	 future),	 social	 structures	 (more	traditional/conservative,	thereby	less	cosmopolitan),	the	moral	strictures	of	the	society	 of	 which	 the	 individual	 is	 part	 (tighter,	 more	 prescriptive,	 more	constraining,	rather	than	open	laissez-faire	approach	allowing	each	individual	to	live	 by	 his	 own	 beliefs),	 the	 individual’s	 circumstances	 that	 are	 determined	 in	part	 by	 the	 individual’s	 (relative)	 wealth	 or	 poverty	 (victors	 expect	 theirs	 to	improve	under	the	new	regime	so	behave	accordingly	while	losers	expect	theirs	to	dis-improve),	the	neighborhood	in	which	he	lives	(expected	to	improve	as,	for	
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example,	 industry	 returns	 and	 migrants	 leave,	 expected	 to	 dis-improve	 as	industry	and	migrants	leave).		Third,	the	e,	the	emotional,	psychological,	spiritual,	intellectual,	physical	and	economic	resources	are	affected.		So,	for	example,	those	on	 the	winning	 side	may	 feel	 heartened,	 hopeful,	 newly	 vigorous,	 again	on	 the	side	of	what	is	right	and	good,	holding	the	expectation	that	their	once	devalued	skills	would	again	be	of	high	and	rising	value	and	that	their	physical	assets	would	appreciate,	while	 those	on	 the	 losing	 side	may	 feel	despondent,	 lethargic,	 their	spirit	 sapped	by	 the	 turn	of	events,	 the	value	of	 their	 skills	and	physical	assets	diminished.		Fourth,	the	spillover	effects,	the	β,	from	pursuing	one	goal	onto	the	effort	 required	 to	achieve	another	goal	may	change,	making	complementary	or	substitutable	goals	easier	or	harder	to	obtain.	 	Finally,	the	closeness	to	the	goal	ideal	 required	 for	 social	 acceptance,	 the	d,	may	change,	making	what	had	been	unachievable	achievable	and	visa	versa.		Thus,	from	the	perspective	of	the	victors,	the	anticipated	change	in	status/regime	alone	leads	to	a	perceived	improvement	in	their	position	vis-à-vis	their	ultimate	goals,	while	the	opposite	may	hold	true	for	the	losers.	
The	Brexit	and	Trump	victories	were,	 interestingly,	 triumphs	of	 the	despairing.		These	 victories	 articulated	 a	 demand	 for	 societal	 change,	 politically,	economically	and	culturally,	 from	those	who	 felt	 they	had	not	been	 listened	 to,	ignored,	 forgotten,	 demeaned,	 that	 is,	 expelled	 from	 society.	 	 Their	 demands,	however,	were	not	for	re-entry	into	society	as	it	had	become	but	into	society	as	they	believe	 it	 should	be.	 	Through	 the	EU	referendum	and	 the	US	presidential	election,	they	have	won	the	argument	for	political	change.	 	But	political	change,	however	disruptive,	will	be	unlikely	to	deliver	all	the	desired	economic,	cultural	
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or	even	political	changes.	 	 	But,	change	will	occur.	 	In	the	face	of	these	changes,	the	 hopeful	 will	 remain	 determined	 to	 attain	 their	 utility	 maximizing	 goals	whatever	 the	 challenges	 no	 matter	 whether	 they	 found	 themselves	 on	 the	winning	 or	 losing	 side	 of	 the	 argument,	 while	 the	 despairing,	 those	 on	 the	winning	 side	of	 the	 argument	who	 see	 the	promises	made	 them	 repudiated	or	those	on	the	losing	side	who	see	their	world	crumble,	are	apt	to	struggle	to	find	a	way,	any	way,	to	their	chosen	goals.	
To	 see	 why	 hope	 and	 despair,	 which	 are	 both	 conditioning	 variables	 and	 a	component	 of	 an	 individual’s	 critical	 emotional	 resources,	 resources	 that	 can	augment	 or	 diminish	 the	 individual’s	 spiritual,	 intellectual,	 psychological	 and	economic	 resources,	 may	 play	 an	 outsized	 role	 in	 individuals’	 responses	 to	societal	change,	we	look	to	Pecchenino	(2011)	and	Pecchenino	(2015).		In	broad-based	 reviews	 of	 a	 number	 of	 distinct	 literatures,	 she	 finds,	 first,	 that	 most	theories	 of	 hope	 have	 a	 strong	 future	 goal	 orientation	where	 the	 future	 looms	large	 in	an	 individual’s	decision-making	process	 (Bloch	and	Ritter	1976,	Meyer	2010,	 Moltmann	 1965).	 	 The	 present,	 rather	 than	 the	 future,	 is	 discounted.		Second,	 for	the	hopeful,	goal	attainment	depends	on	an	individual’s	or	society’s	desire	and	ability	 to	 transform	what	 is	 into	what	should	be	or	 to	move	 toward	what	 should	 or	 will	 be	 even	 if	 that	 goal	 is	 known	 to	 be	 unattainable	 through	human	effort:		nothing	is	impossible	(Pettit	2004,	Moltmann	1985,	Bloch	1986).		Third,	 theories	of	hope	address	 the	process	of	 living,	 the	 journey	one	 is	 taking,	which	suggests	that	one’s	preferences	and	hopes	are	redefined	by	the	constraints	one	faces,	such	as	age	or	disability	 	(Greenstreet	and	Fiddian	2006,	Antonovsky	1987).	 These	 theories	 provide	 a	means	 of	 understanding	 or	 accepting	 fortune	
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and	misfortune	with	equanimity.		All	is	never	lost.		Fourth,	hope	is	not	irrational	but	 may	 rely	 on	 an	 individual’s	 ability	 to	 filter,	 sort	 and	 selectively	 use	information		(Pettit	2004).	 	Fifth,	the	hopeful	are	in	and	of	society.	 	For	despair	she	 finds,	 first,	 that	despair	 is	a	social	malady.	 	Despair	excludes	 the	 individual	from	 society,	 a	 society	 from	 which	 he	 has	 or	 perceives	 himself	 to	 have	 been	expelled	(Steinbock	2007,	Nesse	1999).		Second,	re-entry	into	that	society	is	or	is	perceived	 to	be	exceedingly	difficult	or	 impossible	 (Frank	1974,	Greene	1989).		Third,	because	the	despairing	believe	that	they	have	been	expelled	from	society	they	do	not	perceive	themselves	to	be	bound	by	its	conventions	(Hillbrand	and	Young	2008).		Fourth,	social	relationships	for	the	despairing	become	difficult	or	impossible	(Tangney,	Steuwig	and	Mashek	2007,	Frank	1974).	 	Fifth,	the	ability	to	 act,	 to	 cope	 even	with	 the	 quotidian,	 atrophies	 or	 is	 lost.	 	 Apathy,	 lethargy,	recklessness	 and	 suicide	 are	 common	 responses	 to	 despair	 (Steinbock	 2007).	Sixth,	 life	 is	 without	 value	 or	 meaning.	 	 This	 state	 of	 may	 be	 temporary	 or	permanent.	 	 If	 temporary,	 life	 after	 emerging	 from	 despair	 has	 less	 value.	 	 If	permanent,	a	future,	any	future,	cannot	be	imagined	(Nesse	1999).			
Now	consider	what	has	come	 to	be	seen	as	 the	quintessential	Trump	or	Brexit	voter:		middle-aged,	working	class,	white	male	with	traditional	values	who	is	not	particularly	well	educated,	who	lives	outside	of	a	major	metropolitan	area	where	there	 are	 few	 immigrants,	 who	 lives	 in	 an	 area	 where	 jobs	 are	 routine,	employment	 uncertain	 and	 unemployment	 is	 high	 and	 the	 economy	 is	 not	thriving,	who	has	 seen	what	 had	been	his	 rosy	 future	 tarnished	 and	his	 hopes	fade	 as	 the	 local	 economy	 has	 deteriorated	 (because	 of	 regulation,	 foreign	competition,	international	trade	agreements,	structural	change,	whatever).		Prior	
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to	the	referendum/presidential	election	said	caricature	viewed	himself	as	being	significantly	 distant	 from	 all	 of	 his	 major	 goals,	 gn	–	 gn*	 large	 for	 all	 n,	 as	 not	having	 adequate	 resources	 to	 effectively	 reduce	 this	 distance	 nor	 the	wherewithal	to	enhance	his	resources	(through	retraining	or	relocating	to	where	his	resources	were	more	highly	valued),	e	low,	and	no	prospect	of	getting	close	enough	to	any	goal	given	what	he	perceived	as	society’s	preference	for	the	urban,	college-educated,	 cosmopolitan,	 multicultural,	 white	 collar	 or	 creative	 worker	over	the	ordinary	working	man.	If	he	is	a	member	of	the	long-term	unemployed,	he	has	suffered	from	many	of	its	associated	maladies:	poor	physical	and	mental	health,	 social	 isolation,	 social	 exclusion,	 low	 self-esteem,	 low	 self-efficacy,	 low	self-belief,	 loss	of	 identity,	 inability	 to	act,	 criminal	and/or	anti-social	behavior,	alcohol	and	drug	abuse,	self-harm,	and	suicidal	ideation		(Cooper	2011,	Stuckler,	et	 al.	 2011,	 Wanberg	 2012,	 Proudfoot,	 et	 al.	 1997,	 Goldsmith,	 et	 al.	 1996a,b,	Brenner	 1976,	 Catalano,	 et	 al.	 2011,	 Choudhry,	 et	 al.	 2012),	 behaviors	 that	suggest	 despair:	 indifference	 to	 options	 taken	 and	 the	 consequences	 thereof:		failure	to	attain	any	of	his	goals.		If	he	personally	is	not	a	member	of	this	group,	he	knows	people	who	are.			
After	the	referendum/presidential	election,	he	saw	himself	as	being	closer	to	his	major	goals	 for	 two	 reasons:	 	 first,	 he	perceived	 the	 societal	 goal	 ideal	 to	have	moved	closer	to	where	he	was,	since	society	again	valued	who	and	what	he	was,	an	 ordinary	working	man	with	 traditional	 values,	 the	 bedrock	 of	 society,	 and,	second,	 conditioning	 variables,	 consistent	with	 the	 new	political	 and	 promised	economic	and	cultural	social	order,	enhanced	the	value	of	his	resources.	Without	doing	 anything	 beyond	 casting	 his	 ballot,	 he	 achieved	 or	 came	within	 striking	
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distance	of	social	 inclusion,	recognition	and	acceptance.	 	There	were	now	some	grounds	for	hope	and	with	them	identifiable	and	achievable	paths	to	his	goals.		
Arlie	Russell	Hochschild’s	Strangers	in	Their	Own	Land	 (2016)	recounts	the	five	years	 she	 spent	 getting	 to	 know	members	 of	 the	 American	 right	 in	 the	 bayou	country	of	Louisiana	on	their	own	terms.		In	the	penultimate	chapter	of	the	book,	the	promise	of	Trump	to	her	“white,	middle-aged	and	older,	Christian,	married,	blue-	and	white-collar	Louisianans”	is	explored.		She	finds	that	there	was	a		
“deep	story.”		In	that	story,	strangers	step	ahead	of	you	in	line,	making	you	anxious,	 resentful	 and	 afraid.	 	 A	 president	 allies	 with	 the	 line	 cutters,	making	you	feel	distrustful,	betrayed.		A	person	ahead	of	you	in	line	insults	you	 as	 an	 ignorant	 redneck,	 making	 you	 feel	 humiliated	 and	 mad.		Economically,	 culturally,	 demographically,	 politically,	 you	 are	 suddenly	 a	stranger	in	your	own	land.	(p.	222)		At	 a	 Trump	 campaign	 rally	 Hochschild	 attends,	 Trump	 rails	 against	 the	 EPA,	trade,	globalization,	illegal	immigration,	and	in	favor	of	a	strong	military	that	will	destroy	 ISIS.	 	 He	will	make	 America	 great	 again.	 	 He	 has	 a	 Black	 Lives	Matter	protester	forcibly	evicted.	 	He	further	suggests	that	PC	speech	and	behavior	are	yokes	not	to	be	borne.		Trump	made	her	Louisianan	friends	feel	proud	again,	no	longer	strangers	in	their	own	land.		He	made	them	proud:		to	be	white	Christian	Americans,	 to	 hold	 views	 reviled	 in	 the	 national	 press,	 to	 be	 racist,	 sexist,	 and	bigoted,	to	carry	guns,	to	be	against	abortion	but	for	capital	punishment,	to	sign	up	for	Trumpcare	and	still	maintain	their	manliness.		Under	a	Trump	presidency	America	would	again	the	America	where	they	were	“The	People”.		This	would	be	the	case	even	if	they	still	could	not	achieve	the	American	dream.	
However,	the	grounds	for	hope	found	in	the	Trump	campaign	may	be	tenuous	and	 despair	may	 replace	 hope	 if	 political	 rhetoric	 is	 not	 institutionalized	 in	
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government	 programs	 (the	 urban,	 cosmopolitan,	 multicultural,	 college	educated	 person	 rather	 than	 the	 “strangers	 in	 their	 own	 land”	 remains	 the	focus	of	politicians’	attention)	and	if	the	promised	employment	opportunities	(reopened	 or	 employment	 growth	 in	 factories	 and	 mines)	 and	 community	renewal	do	not	quickly	materialize.			Social	exclusion	from	the	society	you	see	as	your	own	may	be	a	greater	cause	for	despair	than	exclusion	from	a	society	from	which	you	are	already	alienated.		The	repercussions	could	be	significant.		
The	urban,	college-educated,	cosmopolitan,	multicultural,	white	collar	or	creative	worker	 who	 worked	 in	 the	 financial,	 IT	 or	 creative	 sector,	 probably	 voted	Remain	or	for	Hillary	Clinton,	yet	faces	the	same	societal	change.		Some	of	them	will	 see	 this	 change	as	making	 their	path	 to	 their	ultimate	goals	more	difficult,	and	find	themselves	out	of	sync	with	the	new	society	making	their	resources	of	less	value,	that	is	the	distance	gn	–	gn*	has	increased	and	e	has	fallen	as	a	result	of	the	 referendum	 or	 election.	 	 And,	 perhaps,	 dn,	 has	 now	 gotten	 smaller	 –	 one	needs	to	be	closer	to	one’s	goals	to	achieve	social	acceptance:		one	has	to	be	even	better	than	before.		The	hopeful	among	this	group	are	likely	to	filter	out	the	bad	news,	 revise	 their	 paths,	 and	 do	 whatever	 needs	 doing	 to	 achieve	 their	 goals.		This	may	require	returning	to	college	to	acquire	new	skills	or	another	degree.		It	may	require	 reprioritizing	so	 that	a	 complementary	or	 substitutable	goal	 takes	precedence	 given	 changed	 conditioning	 variables	 (a	 less	 tolerant,	 more	conservative	society,	more	nationally	than	internationally	focused	economic	and	social	policies,	etc.)	 	The	hopeful	will	 find	a	way.	 	Those	who	will	struggle	with	the	 new	 political,	 economic	 and	 cultural	 milieu	 are	 those	 who	 had	 been	successful	 in	 the	old	 society	who	have	been	accused	of	aiding	and	abetting	 the	
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economic	and	cultural	declines	that	led	to	these	electoral	outcomes:		immigrants,	legal	 as	 well	 as	 illegal,	 recent	 and	 second	 and	 third	 generation,	 LGBTQ	community	members,	all	those	seen	as	“not	us.”		They	may	succumb	to	despair	if	they	 see	 all	 they	 have	worked	 so	 hard	 to	 obtain:	 	 relative	 economic	 success,	 a	place	 in	 the	 community	 for	 themselves	 and	 their	 families,	 a	 good	 cultural	 and	spiritual	environment,	what	they	thought	of	as	their	home,	the	expectation	of	a	safe	and	secure	future,	become	unobtainable.		
These	 effects,	 essentially	 the	 ins	being	 thrown	out,	 and	 the	 cultural	 and	 social,	but	here	not	economic,	upheaval	 that	causes,	and	can	be	seen	 in	Olga	Khazan’s	2017	article	 in	The	Atlantic.	 	 For	 the	 cosmopolitan,	urban,	 educated,	LGBTQ,	of	recent	 immigrant	heritage	individuals	she	interviews,	Trump’s	election	was	felt	as	a	physical	assault	on	all	they	held	dear	leaving	them	feeling	ill,	dispossessed,	alien	 rather	 than	 citizen,	 in	 despair	 with	 all	 the	 accompanying	 symptoms	 and	behaviors,	hoping,	perhaps	in	vain	and	knowing	that	it	is	in	vain,	for	Trump	to	be	impeached.	 	 They	 now	 were	 the	 strangers	 in	 their	 own	 land	 suffering	 from	cognitive	 dissonance.	 	 	 They	 were	 once	 proud	 Americans	 and	 now	 they	 are	Americans	who	barely	recognize	their	country	in	the	rhetoric	and	policies	of	the	new	presidency,	rhetoric	and	policies	that	make	them	ashamed	of	and	apologize	for	 their	 country.	 	 This	 internal	 conflict	 is	 debilitating,	 both	 physically	 and	mentally.	 	 Hopelessness	 and	 depression	 have	 replaced	 the	 hopefulness	 and	expectation	of	a	better	world	that	characterized	their	Obama	years.	 	Those	who	had	 felt	 accepted	 and	 protected	 by	 both	 law	 and	 cultural	 enlightenment	 feel	fearful.			A	Tea	Party	of	the	left	is	mooted.			“You	 have	 a	 disaffected	mass	 of	 people,”	 [Matthew	Wright	 of	 American	
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University	 is	 quoted	 as	 saying].	 “The	 question	 is	 whether	 that	 will	 get	translated	into	anger	that	will	turn	into	political	change,	or	if	people	will	disengage.”				…“The	Resistance”	can	become	a	new	identity,	 like	the	Tea	Party,	which	helps	Trump-haters	 reconcile	 their	American	pride	with	 their	disgust	 at	American	leadership.”		But	the	fear	remains	that	the	damage	of	the	Trump	presidency	will	be	extensive,	deep	and	long	lasting	whatever	the	liberal	response.			
The	joyful	hopefulness	of	Hochschild’s	Louisianans,	is	negatively	mirrored	by	the	despair	of	Khazan’s	cosmopolitan	liberals.		The	tables	have	been	turned.	Society	has	been	thrown	asunder.		
IV	Conclusion	
Societies	are	never	static,	and	in	this	constant	state	of	flux	individuals	attempt	to	achieve	 their	 goals,	 all	 of	 which	 society	 interprets	 as	 important.	 	 As	 society	changes,	 so	 to	 do	 societal	 goals	 and	 individuals’	 means	 of	 achieving	 them.			Societal	 change	 is	 never	without	 cost.	 	 It	 is	 also	 never	without	 benefits.	 	 	 The	question	 is,	 then,	 to	 whom	 the	 spoils?	 	 While	 previously	 marginalized	 groups	should	be	compensated	 for	past	 societal	 ills,	 the	 ills	 that	 instigated	 the	change,	other	 groups	 should	 not	 be	 marginalized	 or	 penalized.	 	 Instead	 government	actions	 and	 private	 sector	 initiatives	 should	 work	 to	 ensure	 that	 social	marginalization	in	all	spheres,	economic,	political	and	cultural,	is	minimized,	that	societal	failures	are	acknowledged	and	amends	made,	and	that	all	broken	social	relationships	are	repaired.		That	is,	we	should	create	a	world	where	to	the	victors	the	spoils	and	all	are	victorious.	
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